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Clinical experience as evidence in evidence-based practice
Background. This paper’s starting point is the recognition (descriptive not norma-
tive) that, for the vast majority of day-to-day clinical decision-making situations, the
‘evidence’ for decision-making is experiential knowledge. Moreover, reliance on this
knowledge base means that nurses must use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics for
handling information when making decisions. These heuristics encourage systematic
biases in decision-makers and deviations from the normative rules of ‘good’ decis-
ion-making.
Aims. The aim of the paper is to explore three common heuristics and the biases
that arise when handling complex information in clinical decision-making (over-
confidence, hindsight and base rate neglect) and, in response to these biases, to
illustrate some simple techniques for reducing the negative influence of heuristics.
Discussion. Nurses face a limited range of types of uncertainty in their clinical
decisions and draw primarily on experiential knowledge to handle these uncer-
tainties. This paper argues that experiential knowledge is a necessary but not suf-
ficient basis for clinical decision-making. It illustrates how overconfidence in one’s
knowledge base, being correct ‘after the event’ or with the benefit of hindsight, and
ignoring the base rates associated with events, conditions or health states, can
impact on professional judgements and decisions. The paper illustrates some simple
strategies for minimizing the impact of heuristics on the real-life clinical decisions of
nurses.
Conclusion. The paper concludes that more research knowledge of the impact of
heuristics and techniques to combat them in nursing decisions is needed.
Keywords: decision-making, clinical judgement, heuristics, bias, evidence-based
nursing, clinical uncertainty
Introduction
Clinical decisions and the processes that underpin them are
an integral part of the delivery of health care. It is clinical
decisions that commit scarce resources to patients, determine
the clinical outcomes associated with care and, in part, shape
the health care experience for patients and professionals
alike. It is also in the realm of clinical decision-making that
clinical uncertainty presents itself. In fact, medicine has been
described as the ‘art of making decisions without adequate
information’ (Sox et al. 1988, p. 17). Whilst derived from
medicine, this definition could just as easily apply to some
aspects of nursing.
Surprisingly, despite the importance of clinical decisions,
very little is known about the kinds of uncertainties that
health care professionals, and nurses in particular, face. One
way of expressing these uncertainties – and the information
needs of professionals that arise as a result – is by examining
the clinical questions that nurses ask in making their clinical
decisions. Ely et al. (1999) examined the kinds of questions
that doctors ask and found that a typology of only five
categories captured the range of types of uncertainty
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encountered: diagnosis, treatment, management, epidemiol-
ogy and non-clinical questions. The team of researchers to
which I belong at York has found that a taxonomy of six
categories captures the range of decision-based uncertainties
facing acute care nurses (McCaughan 2002): intervention,
timing, targeting, communication, service delivery and
organization, and hermeneutic or experiential (see Table 1).
In examining the ways in which nurses access information
as a response to these uncertainties (Thompson et al. 2001a)
and their perceptions of the information’s usefulness in
reducing the uncertainties associated with clinical decisions
(Thompson et al. 2001b), we have found that most rely
heavily on experience to meet the information needs associ-
ated with decision choices under conditions of uncertainty.
This reliance on experience – either their own or the
combined experience of others – raises the obvious question
of whether experience is a sufficient basis for reliable clinical
decision-making. Specifically, does experience reduce the
chances of error or poor decision outcomes?
Of course, even where nurses may wish to make use of
research knowledge, as opposed to tacit self-knowledge or
the orally transferred knowledge of colleagues, it is
sometimes difficult to do so. They may lack the necessary
computer and searching skills to access research information
effectively and efficiently; not have the necessary hardware or
software in the care environment; lack the critical appraisal
skills necessary to interpret research findings for validity,
clinical importance and applicability; and they may have to
operate in an organizational environment which is not
conducive to implementing research or evidence-based
change.
Evidence-based practice: a working definition
Commentators have chosen to interpret the central tenets of
evidence-based health care differently. For the sake of clarity,
and because this paper has a nursing focus, I shall adopt the
definition proposed by DiCenso et al. (1998). Evidence-based
nursing is a process by which nurses make clinical decisions
using the best available research evidence, their clinical
expertise and patient preferences, in the context of available
resources. Evidence-based nursing is designed to be a
systematic means of combating the biases that arise from
uninformed (by research evidence) decision-making. It does
Table 1 The decision types and focused clinical questions of acute care nurses in the UK (McCaughan 2002)
Decision type Exemplar decision Exemplar question
Intervention/effectiveness:
These kinds of decisions involved
choosing between intervention
Choosing a mattress for a frail elderly
man on who has been admitted with
an acute bowel obstruction
In elderly and inactive patients,
who may require surgical intervention,
which is the most suitable pressure
relieving mattress to prevent pressure sores?
Targeting: this is, strictly speaking,
a subcategory of intervention/effectiveness
decisions outlined above. These decisions
were of the form, ‘choosing which patient
will most benefit from the intervention’
Deciding which patients should get
anti-embolic stockings
Is there a risk assessment tool available
that will accurately predict which group
of patients will benefit most
from anti-embolic stockings?
Timing: again, a subcategory
of intervention/effectiveness decisions.
These commonly take the form of choosing
the best time to deploy the intervention
Choosing a time to commence asthma
education on newly diagnosed asthmatics
When to commence asthma education
on newly diagnosed asthmatics?
Communication: these kinds of decisions
commonly focus on choices relating to ways
of delivering and receiving information
to and from patients, families or colleagues.
Sometimes these decisions are specifically related
to the communication of risks and benefits
of different interventions or prognostic categories
Choosing how to approach cardiac
rehabilitation with an elderly patient
following acute myocardial infarction
who lives alone with their family nearby
Would I be better talking and explaining
rehab with the patient’s family present
so that a clear understanding is obtained
prior to the patient’s discharge?
Service organization, delivery and management:
these kinds of decisions concern the configuration
or processes of service delivery
Choosing how to organize handover
so that communication is most effective
How should I organize handover
so that the most effective form
of communicating information results?
Experiential, understanding or hermeneutic:
these relate to the interpretation of cues
in the process of care
Choosing how to reassure a patient
who is worrying about cardiac arrest
after witnessing another patient arresting
How best do you reassure a patient
who has witnessed someone having
a cardiac arrest?
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this by steering clinicians towards the best form of research
evidence, given the kind of clinical uncertainty they face.
‘Best’ in this context means research based on a design most
likely to lead to valid and reliable results and reduce the
uncertainties that led to seeking information in the first place.
These best designs are sometimes referred to as hierarchies of
evidence. For example, for clinical decisions involving
selecting a treatment or intervention from a discrete range
of choices, then systematic reviews of good quality random-
ized controlled trials are usually considered the most valid
and reliable research designs, non-randomized controlled
studies less so, and non-controlled cohort designs even less
than that. The least reliable and valid form of evidence,
however, is always professional opinion when used on its
own. Nevertheless, evidence it is, and nurses appear to place a
higher value on it for decision-making than any other source
of information available in practice (Thompson et al. 2001b).
Proponents of evidence-based practice may not like this
picture (and certainly I agree with them) but the problem for
clinicians – and researchers studying them – is how to make
good quality decisions when primarily drawing on experien-
tial knowledge.
The problem
The field of cognitive science has generated many answers to
the problem of how people should make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty. Some examples of these normative
‘decision rules’ are: use objective probabilities, avoid using
hindsight knowledge, choose the option with the largest
expected gain and smallest expected loss, and be aware of the
effect of the ways in which decision choices are ‘framed’. The
problem is that people consistently fail to adhere to such
normative models of behaviour in real life decision-making.
In order to understand decision models it is necessary to
understand the idea of probabilities.
Subjective probabilities
In their pure, unadulterated state probabilities represent
chance, or a numeric measure of the uncertainty associated
with an event or events. Like other forms of numbers they
have complex properties – they can be added, multiplied and
combined in various ways. Probabilities range from 0
(representing complete uncertainty) to 1 (representing com-
plete certainty). For example, in research reports the short-
hand P ¼ 0.05 means there is 5% probability that the event
observed happened by chance. Of course, people rarely use
probabilities in this pure form in real life. Instead, they prefer
to express probabilities as odds (such as a ‘1000 to 1’ chance)
or as percentages (there’s a 35% chance). Even more likely in
health care is the expression of probabilities in qualitative
terms: ‘there’s a good chance that wound dressing X will
improve your pressure ulcer more than wound dressing Y’ or
‘it is much more likely to be disease A than disease B’.
So individuals fail to use probabilities in their objective
sense and, even where they do, they fail to follow the rules for
combining them properly (Robinson & Hastie 1985). More-
over, for the messy and complex decisions of clinical practice,
they make use of a series of cognitive shortcuts called
heuristics. These heuristics, and their use by clinicians, have
been well documented both in medicine (Christensen-
Szalanski & Bushyhead 1981) and amongst midwives (Cioffi
1997). Heuristics, whilst useful and necessary, have one
unfortunate characteristic: they introduce a series of system-
atic biases into decisions. It is these biases and possible ways
of combating them that are the focus of this paper.
Of course, one way of combating the biases arising from
subjective probabilities and use of heuristics is to make use of
research knowledge in decision processes. Good quality
research knowledge combats the sorts of biases associated
with the generation of subjective probabilities by using data
collection and analytic techniques designed to minimize the
chances of introducing systematic errors into conclusions.
However, research knowledge is not always available or, as
already highlighted, some individuals may lack the know-
ledge and skills to make use of it in meaningful ways.
This situation represents something of a dilemma, in that
the decisions we make as professionals often merit the use of
research-based knowledge. However, that knowledge is
frequently not available in a format we can readily use. Yet
we want to make the best possible decisions for our patients.
Fortunately, despite the presence and impact of heuristics,
there are techniques that individuals can be applied and
which serve to confine or limit heuristic impact on decision
choices. Because there are many heuristics, biases and
systematic deviations from the normative rules of decision-
making, I will focus on just three of the most common:
overconfidence, hindsight and neglecting base rates of
diseases or conditions in populations.
Real-life strategies for handling clinical decisions:
heuristics, biases and some strategies for
improvement
Overconfidence
Individuals often overestimate the ‘correctness’ of their
knowledge, and a number of definitive studies have shown
that people are often overconfident when it comes to
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decision-making or judgement tasks (Fischoff & MacGregor
1975, Lichenstein & Fischoff 1977). Overconfidence occurs
at many levels, but two of the most common are as a response
to knowledge questions and in subjectively predicting the
progress of events or individuals. The Nottingham University
Behavioural Sciences team have produced a series of exercises
(available at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/mczwww/tltp/
decis.htm) which graphically demonstrate how reliance on
your own sense of confidence – even when applied to a range
of answers rather than point estimates, and where you only
need to be 90% sure – can be hopelessly inaccurate. Dawes
(1979) examined the subjective predictions of clinicians
about the outcomes of people with mental health problems
and found that these were far less accurate and consistent
than judgements made using objective indicators or measures
of progress. Clearly, such overconfidence has implications for
treatment or management decisions based primarily on
experientially-informed judgement.
Combating overconfidence
The ability to know what you do not know and revise esti-
mates of correctness accordingly is referred to as calibration
and is the key to combating the bias introduced by over-
confidence. There are a variety of techniques for increasing
calibration.
Firstly, one of the reasons people appear overconfident in
new situations is that they rely on estimates of the probability
of the area rather than use their detailed knowledge of the
question asked or decision task faced. By avoiding predictions
in unfamiliar domains, we can combat this.
Another simple way of combating overconfidence is by
consciously adjusting your own personal confidence estimates
downwards. So, for example, if in the face of an uncertain
decision choice you believe that you are 90% sure that
decision option A is the correct choice, then try asking
yourself if you would still make the same choice based on the
fact that you are only 75% sure. One way of forcing yourself
to revisit your personal confidence limits is to think of
reasons why you might be wrong or to try to falsify the
assumptions that underpin your decision choice.
Feedback on decisions can be a powerful means of
combating overconfidence. Lichenstein and Fischoff (1980)
demonstrated that students who received reports and expla-
nations of results tended toward under- rather than over-
confidence on a one-sided probability ‘rating of correctness’
scale for two-choice knowledge questions. For a less aca-
demic and more accessible example, consider the good
performance (on average) of weather forecasters. The reason
why they are so calibrated is that they receive continuous
feedback on the justification of their confidence levels.
The following clinical example illustrates what such
calibration and feedback might look like. Imagine that
you are a staff nurse working on a day surgery unit. You
have an informal analgesia protocol that you apply to most
of your patients with hernia repairs because you are fairly
confident (based on a couple of years’ experience) that it
works and that patients get a few hours relatively pain-free
at home after they have left the unit. However, you have
not really stopped to consider whether there are better
alternatives, and you realize that you receive no feedback on
whether the pain relief carries on working in the hours after
discharge. You decide that if the pain relief was not effective
after discharge then you would – in all probability – try and
devise something better. You decide to ‘test’ whether your
confidence is justified. You arrange for one of your
colleagues or yourself to administer a pain measurement
scale to each patient before leaving the ward and then
phone them within 6 hours of discharge and simply ask
them to complete it again and send it back. The findings
surprise you, and you realize that in fact a large proportion
of patients’ pain is not well managed by the protocol after
discharge. Obviously, you would not have received this
information if you had not sought feedback on your initial
decision choice. Clearly, you now have a solid footing for a
more evidence-based approach to revision of the pain relief
protocol, and repeat the ‘decision audit’ at a later date to
see if this has worked.
Hindsight
When asked to predict an event in advance, people who know
that such an event actually occurs assign higher probabilities
of it occurring than those who did not know that the event
occurs (Fischoff 1975). This phenomenon – called hindsight
bias – can lead to people changing the relative importance of
influences that their judgement tells them are responsible for
an event. In short, knowing the outcome of an event makes
subsequent similar outcomes more likely. Arkes et al. (1981)
demonstrated that physicians who knew the correct diagno-
ses for a series of medical conditions were more likely to
assign a higher probability to those diagnoses after the event.
These findings have a number of important implications.
First, when confronted with a priori knowledge of an event,
clinicians attempt to make sense of what they know has
happened, rather than working with objective data. The
implications of this for nurses (particularly expert nurses) can
be seen in the popularity of teaching diagnosis using real
clinical cases in the clinical environment. Nurses should
always work prospectively from diagnostic work-up to
prognostic or treatment decisions, rather than working
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backwards from diagnosis. If they already know the diagno-
sis, then it is likely that they will ‘see’ the appropriate clinical
cues. It is far better that they should work from clinical cues
to the diagnosis. Arkes et al. (1981) have demonstrated this
effect in medicine. They showed 15 physicians a case history
accompanied by laboratory test results, and asked them to
provide probabilities for four different (but possible) diag-
noses. The probabilities at this stage were 44%, 29%, 16%
and 11%, respectively. Separate groups of 15 doctors were
told prior to reading the case history that the diagnosis was
one of the four possible options. Having this information
changed the probabilities to 39%, 35%, 38% and 31%,
respectively. On average, then, hindsight adds around 11% to
the probability estimate of a correct diagnosis, regardless of
whether the diagnosis is actually correct – note that this is an
‘average’ figure and includes downward shifts in estimates as
well as positive revisions. There are a number of other
problems associated with hindsight, including the favourable
distortion of memory (Fischoff & Beyth 1975) and (rather
worryingly from a researcher’s perspective) undervaluing the
original nature of predictive thought and ideas expressed via
scientific manuscripts submitted to peer reviewed journals
(Slovic & Fischoff 1977).
Combating hindsight bias
There are two very useful techniques that can directly or
indirectly reduce the impact of hindsight bias on clinical
decision-making. The first, challenging decision-makers or
judges by instructing them to ignore hindsight, could be useful
(but difficult to implement in practice) (Hasher et al. 1981).
The second is asking professionals to provide reasons why an
outcome occurred and/or get them to focus on alternative
possible outcomes that may have occurred (regardless of
whether they actually did or not) (Slovic & Fischoff 1977).
Base rate neglect
As nurses are increasingly asked to consider ordering (and
interpreting) diagnostic tests, it is essential that they under-
stand the importance of acknowledging base rates associated
with diseases or conditions in populations. The normative
rule for situations in which there are two independent
probabilities of the same event (for example, the presence
of a particular disease such as depression) is to combine the
two independent probabilities. The independent probabilities
in this case (a diagnostic decision) are the prior probability of
having depression, for example, and the probability of having
depression, given the results of a diagnostic test. This
normative rule is known as Bayes’ method and can be
expressed as:
Prior odds likelihood ratio ¼ posterior odds
The problem for decision-makers and nurse researchers is
that clinicians tend to ignore or place insufficient weight on
the prior probabilities (base rates) associated with conditions
or phenomena – a situation known as base rate neglect. The
bias this introduces into decision-making (particularly diag-
nostic decision-making) can have important consequences.
An example will help illustrate this.
Imagine that you are a staff nurse working in a community
stroke rehabilitation clinic. Your experience tells you that
being depressed whilst undergoing treatment does not help
the treatment to succeed: you do not eat properly, you feel
lethargic and your social relationships suffer. Clearly you
would like to be able accurately to detect depression in
patients and instigate appropriate treatment or referrals.
During a Medline search you find a paper (Passik et al. 2001)
which suggests that the Brief Zung Self-Rating Depression
Scale (BZSDS) can be adapted so that a score of more than 33
is a useful cut-off for diagnosing depression in practice. It is
quick to administer, and in 35 patients only one false positive
result was generated. The paper reports that the BZSDS has a
sensitivity of 29% and a specificity of 97%. This seems
satisfactory – although if you are brutally honest you are not
entirely sure what this might mean for your patients.
You note that the study was conducted in oncology units
and that the prevalence of moderate depression in these
settings was between 15% and 25%. You cannot be sure
what the prevalence would be in your clinical area, but a
colleague administered the Beck Depression Inventory as
part of their Master’s degree research and this suggested
that around 5% of your patients were moderately
depressed. Looking at the paper again, you decide to
follow the normative decision rule and combine the prior
and likelihood probabilities associated with the results
presented and see what happens to the results if the lower
prevalence of depression in your patients is taken into
account. Knowing this information will help you decide if
the test is useful or not. There are a variety of ways of
combining the probabilities, but the easiest is to construct a
2  2 table (Hunink et al. 2001) using the information
presented in the paper. In this example, I have used a
fictional cohort of 10 000 patients for ease of computation.
The answers are the same if more reasonable clinical
numbers are used.
Using the method is a four-stage process, as outlined in
Table 2. The final ‘positive test’ row (i.e. for those patients
who have a BZSDS of more than 33) shows that the post-test
probability (for a pretest probability, i.e. base rate, of 25%)
of actually having depression given a positive test score is
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76% (725/950). Therefore, as a tool for identifying depres-
sion in oncology patients, the BZSDS appears quite useful.
But what happens to the utility of the test when the ‘real
world’ prevalence of 5% (i.e. the base rate of depression in
your patients) is inserted into the table? Table 3 demonstrates
the impact of the lower base rate.
What Table 3 shows is that, of 430 patients who would be
expected to have a positive test result, only 145 actually have
depression. So the post-test probability of having depression
is only 33% (given a pretest probability of 5%). In this case,
and for your patients, perhaps the test is not quite as useful an
aid to diagnosing depression.
A number of studies have found that in the laboratory
clinicians (like all humans) are poor at taking into account
base rates (Casscells et al. 1978, Fischoff et al. 1979).
However, Christensen-Szalanski and Bushyhead (1981)2 sug-
gest that, when clinicians are encouraged to draw on
experience to generate base rates, their use more closely
approximates the normatively ‘correct’ way of combining
probabilities. As far as I am aware, little research into the
ways in which nurses use diagnostic probabilities has been
conducted. However, the work of Offredy (2002) shows that
nurses do not appear to revise probabilities or adjust
diagnostic strategies for different base rates, even when
ZBSD result Depression No depression Total by row
Step 1: use prevalence to fix column totals: 25%  10 000 ¼ 2500
Positive (>33)
Negative (<33)
Total by column 2500 7500 10 000
Step 2: use sensitivity to fill in disease column: 29%  2500 ¼ 725
Positive (>33) 725
Negative (<33) 1775
Total by column 2500 7500 10 000
Step 3: use specificity to fill in non-disease column: 97%  7500 ¼ 7275
Positive (>33) 725 225
Negative (<33) 1775 7275
Total by column 2500 7500 10 000
Step 4: compute row totals: 725 þ 225 ¼ 950
Positive (>33) 725 225 950
Negative (<33) 1775 7275 9050
Total by column 2500 7500 10 000
Table 2 The steps in probability revision
for the Zung Brief Self-Report Depression
Scale (ZBSD) for diagnosing depression
(oncology patients)
Table 3 The steps in probability revision
for the Zung Brief Self-Report Depression
Scale (ZBSD) For Diagnosing Depression
(community based stroke rehabilitation
Patients)
ZBSD result Depression No depression Total by row
Step 1: use prevalence to fix column totals: 5%  10 000 ¼ 500
Positive (>33)
Negative (<33)
Total by column 500 9500 10 000
Step 2: use sensitivity to fill in disease column: 29%  500 ¼ 145
Positive (>33) 145
Negative (<33) 355
Total by column 500 9500 10 000
Step 3: use specificity to fill in non-disease column: 97%  9500 ¼ 9215
Positive (>33) 145 285
Negative (<33) 355 9215
Total by column 500 9500 10 000
Step 4: compute row totals: 145 þ 285 ¼ 430
Positive (>33) 145 285 430
Negative (<33) 355 9215 9570
Total by column 500 9500 10 000
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qualitatively ‘rare’ or ‘common’ conditions are presented as
decision tasks.
Combating base rate neglect
Theoretically, the simplest way of encouraging nurses to
acknowledge base rates is to teach them how to use them in
their decision-making. However, from personal experience
and discussion with other academics, I am unsure how many
nurses are taught the relatively simple techniques illustrated
above for using probabilistic information correctly. More use
could be made of local prevalence audits, such as those
conducted in relation to pressure area and chronic wound
care. Specifically, when local prevalence is taken into
account, the results of the multitude of pressure risk assess-
ment scales can become pretty meaningless. For example, in
one study the Waterlow scale wrongly classified 72 of 185
patients as ‘at risk’ from pressure ulcers (Chan et al. 1997).
Even very sensitive and specific tests will produce a large
proportion of false positives when the prevalence of the
disease or condition is exceedingly low. The influences of
base rates have obvious implications for the role of nurses in
mass screening for rare conditions. One example here might
be the number of false positive arising from universal
newborn hearing screening, which is associated with 25–50
false positives for every true case of hearing impairment
(Wessex Universal Neonatal Hearing Screening Trial Group
1998).
Conclusion and a caveat
I have drawn attention to the fact that most nurses draw on
experience and experiential knowledge as the prime sources of
evidence for most day-to-day clinical decisions that they
encounter. Whilst I am a strong advocate of evidence-based
practice (in its ‘classical’ format), I am forced to concede that in
many instances the evidence used in clinical decision-making is
not always good quality research knowledge able to be
critically appraised for validity, clinical significance and
applicability. With this reliance on experiential knowledge
and intuitive modes of decision-making comes a commensur-
ate reliance on cognitive shortcuts or heuristics in handling
knowledge for decision-making. These entirely necessary
heuristics introduce systematic biases into decisions and
deviations from the normative rules of ‘good’ decision-making.
The paper draws attention to three common heuristics and
biases: overconfidence, hindsight and base rate neglect. Of
course, there are many more heuristics and biases than can be
described in one short paper (for example, anchoring, avail-
ability and ignoring the expected utility of interventions).
Alongside these examples I have also presented some strategies
for theoretically minimizing their impact on the real-life
clinical decisions of nurses. The aim of doing so is not to
encourage clinicians to adopt these strategies in a wholesale
and uncritical fashion, but rather to encourage debate on how
we might research these concepts and processes in nursing. If
we are serious about improving the decisions and judgements
of nurses, then only by exposing our limitations (and indeed
strengths) can we begin to design solutions.
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